WEBVTT

1
00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:37.000
<v Speaker A>Imagine a justice system built on rigorous evidence, not gut instincts or educated guesses about what works and what doesn't. More people could access the civil justice they deserve. The criminal justice system could be smaller, more effective, and more humane. The Access to Justice Lab here at Harvard Law School is producing that needed evidence and this podcast is about the challenge of transforming law into an evidence based field. I'm your host Jim Greiner and this is Proof Over Precedent. This week we're bringing you a student voice

2
00:00:37.000 --> 00:02:49.000
<v Speaker B>hi everyone, my name is Ashul Javeri. I'm a second year GED candidate at Harvard Law School. Thanks for listening to the Proof Over Precedent podcast hosted by the Access to Justice Lab. Today we're going to talk about a topic that might not initially seem like a core Access to Justice issue, but we'll soon learn is. And that topic is Cybersecurity for Courts and Court Systems. This podcast is an extension of my blog post that you can find on the A2J website, which goes into how courts at all levels of government, federal, state and local are facing severe cybersecurity challenges that are sometimes really hindering litigants access to justice. The blog post talks about two major recent hacks of the federal judiciary's case management an electronic case filing system known as cmecf, of which the public facing aspect is the PACER system which many of you listeners might be familiar with in 2020 and then again in 2025. That system, which not only holds the public facing documents you access on pacer, but the sealed and confidential documents containing sensitive information like trade secrets, personal identifying information and more, was hacked by suspected nation state actors. And you can read my blog post for more details on that, why the 2025 hack actually exploited some of the same vulnerabilities as the 2020 hack and why it's taking so long to fix. But right now on the podcast I want to focus not just on federal courts, but state and local courts which handle the vast majority of cases and where most normal litigants will play. And that's because today I'm joined by Shea Cleary, who's the Managing Director of Court Consulting Services at the national center for State Courts. Shea is an expert on court cybersecurity and other technologies, including artificial intelligence. He represents NCSC on the Advisory Council of the ABA Task Force on the Law and Artificial Intelligence and was staff lead for the Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court Administrators AI Rapid Response Team. He also worked in the Minnesota state court System for over 20 years in various Technical roles. Thank you. Thanks for joining us, Shay.

3
00:02:49.000 --> 00:02:56.000
<v Speaker C>Thank you for having me. And excited to talk about this issue because cybersecurity is absolutely tied to access to justice.

4
00:02:56.000 --> 00:03:20.000
<v Speaker B>So maybe we can just start off by you telling us about your day job. It sounds like you travel a lot and advise a lot of state and local court systems on their cybersecurity issues. What trends are you seeing? How big is the issue? How prepared are courts? Because obviously cybersecurity issues have been around for many years at this point, but it seems like the problem is just getting worse.

5
00:03:20.000 --> 00:05:38.000
<v Speaker C>Sure. So for those of your, your listeners who may not be as familiar with the national center for State courts, we're about 55 years old, and we were founded in 1971 at the urging of Chief Justice Warren Berger. And he was, he was calling for a national group to focus on state courts because as you said, state courts handle the great majority of, of court cases. I think it's some, somewhere along, upwards of 94% of court cases go through the state courts. And our expertise is in providing research, education, expert consulting services around a variety of topics, including technology, security, courthouse planning, access to justice, as well as different types of programs in courts, whether it's treatment courts or veteran veterans courts. We provide expertise around that. And we spend a lot of time in our group providing education on cybersecurity. And when we ask our, when we ask the groups we represent, which includes the Conference of Chief Justices, which is all 50 state court justices, as well as the Conference of State Corps Administrators, which is the 50 or so stakeholder administrators, what are their priorities? Right. And in the last few years, cybersecurity has been in the top five, which is one of the reasons that we focused on that. And they've asked about how big of an issue cybersecurity is with the state courts. And it's a pretty big issue. But it's not just a court problem. It's a real, when you look at courts, they're grouped into, especially state courts. State, state, local, tribal, and territorial entities. State, we have grouped. So when they're grouped with those state and local entities, attacks are up 84% across all those. CrowdStrike puts out an annual threat report, and in 2025, they were up 84%. We do some informal tracking here of cybersecurity incidents, the major ones that are publicized, and they're double since 2023 in the data that we keep. And there's a number of reasons for this that I think we'll get into later with questions such as the structure. But one thing is a lot of courts have legacy systems, and some of those legacy systems are harder to secure than others, as well as funding challenges. It's definitely a problem. I really think in the last couple of years, courts have responded largely, largely to some of the efforts that we're doing and other entities on how to improve their cybersecurity posture.

6
00:05:38.000 --> 00:06:37.000
<v Speaker B>Okay, so that's super helpful. And it seems like it's not just an access to justice issue, maybe, but it's an access to government issue as well. When you have not just the state court system going down, but the DMV going down, or any other executive branch, quote, unquote agency within the state government being affected, but focusing specifically on the, maybe on the courts. So you mentioned a little bit about the structure challenges and then a little bit about the funding challenges. So maybe we can start off with that first one. How couldn't court systems be better structured to improve their cybersecurity? What are we seeing there in terms of common problems or threads that how state court systems are structured? And then is there anything that we can do beyond obviously just increasing funding for these initiatives? Is it just the money problem or is there something deeper that we need to address?

7
00:06:37.000 --> 00:09:21.000
<v Speaker C>Sure, Great question. So looking at the, at the structure, courts by nature, especially state courts, they're a separate branch of government, right? And a lot of the funding and support comes from statewide entities or the executive branch. And so in many cases, you actually want the court to their technology stack as well as their systems be separate from that. You could certainly have an instance where an individual or business is suing a state, county, or municipality entity, and the courts are responsible for, for helping to resolve that dispute or see that through the system. So right there, you certainly don't want to have certain state, local entities have access to those court systems. So that presents a challenge right there. And in many cases, courts are. They're riding on those state, county, or city networks, but they're separate. They have separate systems. So they have to focus on those which presents a challenge. And they're often their technology and cybersecurity services are only as good as what those provide. Some of the other challenges unique to courts and are critically and foundationally important is that by their very nature, courts are open to the public. There are certain parts of the court record that needs to be open so that the general public knows what's happening. They have an opportunity to see how their court's operating. It's critically important to access to justice trust, public trust, and Confidence in the courts. So that's, that presents a challenge. And the other challenge specifically tied to access to justice, I think is that over the last 20 years, courts have really focused on providing services to services to citizens to be able to better understand how courts work, access services. And this is primarily tied to taking 150 years of paper and digitizing it. And once you have that electronic record, you can make e filing available, making it a little bit easier for people to file and interact with the court. You can have public records available so that people can access data online and documents online. And we're seeing a lot of courts focus on services such as electronic reminders like you get from your dentist office. And it's amazing how a simple reminder will help someone remember they need to go to court and avoid a fail to appear, a warrant being issued and all the downstream consequences. But as courts make things more open and available, that only increases attack surfaces because there's more things for threat actors and attacks, there's more entry points, more things that need to be secure for them to attack the court. And I'm not saying that other state, local and tribal entities don't have those same challenges, but courts, we're open, we're transparent and we have to balance that out with appropriate security.

8
00:09:21.000 --> 00:10:54.000
<v Speaker B>Yeah, that makes a lot of sense. And I think on the second point that you were talking about, I remember reading how when the federal judiciary was just trying to implement multi factor authentication, it took them so long because their, their, their constituency includes pro se litians who might not even have a cell phone or, and this was actually really funny to me. I read a lot of reports from actually major law firms because the partner who would be, who's under, under whose name you would actually file never actually did any of the filing. Obviously that's handled by the separate team of paralegals or staff and they get the, the push notification for multi factor authentication, but that would just go to their paralegal and not them. And it's like, or vice versa. And that was a big issue. And then so I think that just goes to say, say like there's a lot of stakeholders involved with courts, not beyond just the litigants and, and that being the general public. And they need to take it, take notice of that as well, which might, which might attack, increase the, the attack space like you said. So what, what, what, Maybe we can talk about some of the NCSC initiatives. What, what are you guys doing to help courts? Whether that's consulting, whether that's report writing and things like that.

9
00:10:54.000 --> 00:14:37.000
<v Speaker C>Sure. And before we jump into that, in thinking a little bit about more cybersecurity and access to justice, this is actually one of the first things we do when we do a training or tabletop exercises for courts and we talking exactly what a cyber security attack is. Right. And the kind of standard definition is that it's anything that impacts the CIA of your data or the court record, and that's the confidentiality. So making it unavailable maybe to due to a DDoS attack or something else, the integrity which is could be manipulating records or even some extortion and then the availability if it's unavailable, that then prevents people from accessing things. From a personal experience, back In Minnesota around 2015, we had a number of attacks on our public website. DDoS attacks. They weren't stealing information, but they would take our system completely down, flooded with so many requests, our website would just crash. And our Chief justice at the time, she was irate. She was, she was sharing. This is an access to justice issue. I want the FBI here. I want everyone here. We need to get this resolved. And it really hit home to me how important it is for our services to be accessible. If people can't get court information, the justice system stops. So some things we're doing at the national center is first, we're at the tail end of a grant that's funded by the State Justice Institute, or sji, and we received a grant from them to host a series of cybersecurity and disaster recovery workshops across the country. And we've done this in all different regions of the state. We have our last one actually coming up next week in, in the New England region. And these have been an amazing success. And I think the reason they've been a success is because we're bringing all the decision makers to the table who are going to be part of a. If they have a cybersecurity attack, they're the ones who are going to respond. So what we do is we bring the Chief justice or a judge at the. The state decides to come with the State Corps Administrator, of course, their IT staff. So their cio, their, their chief Information Security officer, if they have one, their Public Information officer. Because it's amazing how you don't realize how much you need to communicate to the media and public until you run through a scenario. And the other thing we've done is we've partnered with the center for Internet Security, or CIS on these tabletops. And they've been. Been a great partner as well as our. We have a group called CTalk, which is the Chief Information Technology Officers Consortium, it's a long name, but basically it's the, it's all the CIOs in state courts as well as other courts. And what we do is we bring them together for a tabletop exercise, first online and then in person, and we run through a scenario. It's a ransomware attack, it's data is stolen, data's posted out on the web, the media catches wind of it, the public's angry. And what we do is we have them wrestle with all those things that are part of a, part of a serious attack and where it really adds a lot of value is I think often the IT folks know this. Right. But it really opens eyes to the administrators and the business side how important it is to be prepared for this. And just that we hear time and time again what a valuable experience that is. And recognizing the importance of practicing good cybersecurity hygiene, funding IT where necessary, and really planning another piece of those exercises would be created a incident response plan. It's an all hazards approach, but if a court doesn't have a plan on how to respond to an attack, we now have one available for them and they're actually publicly available. If someone wants to download the template and utilize it to improve their cybersecurity posture.

10
00:14:37.000 --> 00:14:50.000
<v Speaker B>Yeah, that makes, that's, that's really awesome. And have you, have you noticed that a lot of, are a lot of court systems prepared? Or have they, do they have plans or is that something that we need to work on?

11
00:14:50.000 --> 00:15:14.000
<v Speaker C>It varies. It varies quite a bit. Many do have plans. One thing that we really advocate is that please test your plans. And we even have had states attend who are really well prepared. They have really robust and mature cybersecurity posture and plans. But we run through it and they realize, oh, we have an outdated vendor or we're going to, we're going to meet at this conference line that no longer exists because things are continually changing.

12
00:15:14.000 --> 00:15:15.000
<v Speaker B>Yeah.

13
00:15:15.000 --> 00:15:32.000
<v Speaker C>And as a result, actually we're every October, the National center, we're going to offer a virtual tabletop exercise for any, any justice system partner or court who wants to attend and kind of check that box because Best Practices is at least doing it twice a year. We're going to provide that forum for them.

14
00:15:32.000 --> 00:16:16.000
<v Speaker B>Okay, that's, that's really great. So when you're, when you're doing these exercises. Yeah. It seems like, like you said, not just the IT people need to be aware of the issue and because a lot of the decision, actually most of the Decision makers are not IT people. They're the judicial conferences or the administrative conferences. And so they, they need to be aware of the issue. So have you noticed any trade offs in increasing like we, like I was talking about earlier, increasing, I don't know if friction is the right word, but increasing, putting in increased measures of cybersecurity and that making it more difficult to access core technology.

15
00:16:16.000 --> 00:17:17.000
<v Speaker C>There always are, but I do think they're workable. And the example you talked about earlier I think was good. One thing we see especially with public records and public access systems is sometimes you'll get, you'll get requests from outside the United States or other countries and sometimes it's a, it's a truly valid request. Sometimes it's people, people scraping records and so sometimes things will be instituted like captcha. Right. Which makes it a little bit it, it's a little less of a convenience if you have to enter this code in every time and prove your human every time you want to access a record for it. Maybe a self represented litigant who isn't doing it that often it's a little bit more, it's a little bit easier. But if you're a legal aid organization or running a self help center, if you can't get access to a special account it adds complexity to the, to the work you're trying to do. The other thing we see is geo blocking from other countries if it's, it's hard to understand where all requests are coming from. So sometimes you'll, you'll block your services from, from other areas as a security precaution.

16
00:17:17.000 --> 00:18:05.000
<v Speaker B>That makes. Yeah, that. Okay, that, that I didn't even realize like how much organizations are affected by the increasing cyber or just putting in these, these kind of requirements. Not just what you normally think of when you think of pro se litigants. Yeah, so that's a great point. How much of the problem. So it seems like I don't, I feel like some people say that a lot of things are being privatized nowadays. Do you think that courts are increasingly relying on third party vendors and does that pose any sort of issue or is that the opposite actually? And the vendors are like really first rate and they're, they're helping solve the problem.

17
00:18:05.000 --> 00:19:43.000
<v Speaker C>Great question. I think, I think it's yes to, to both. If you, if you have the ability to create your own applications and you have a software development shop, it's imperative that you also have the ability to make sure that your code is secure and that your, you have the tools and things in place to ensure it's a secure solution, especially with some of the information that courts have. And there's some strategies to that secure architecture make sure like your public access systems are hitting a replicated database that only contains public information. Right. So there's some strategies there as far as utilizing outside vendors, it depends. There's some that are really, really good and they ensure that they have SOC2 reports and practice good cybersecurity processes. But then there's some that are starting off that may not. And one of the things that I think we could do a better job of helping courts with is ensuring and we do some of this, but in the RFI or RFP process or contracting process, make sure that we're spelling out cybersecurity expectations and patching expectations and breach notification expectations. There are some vendors that are perhaps better than others. CISA has a secure design pledge which private companies can sign and it says that they're adhering to certain cybersecurity things. And then again there's reports and courts really just need to, when they're selecting a vendor, really vet, call and make sure they really do have a SOC 2 report. But they're not just saying it. Make sure they're practicing secure, secure, secured by design lifecycle and those sorts of things. Okay. Yeah. Some other things courts can do. Sorry, while we're, we're doing.

18
00:19:43.000 --> 00:19:44.000
<v Speaker B>Yeah, let's get into it.

19
00:19:44.000 --> 00:20:48.000
<v Speaker C>And this is a problem with, with all of government entities or state court, local, whatever tribal, territorial is. Again, with government entities, we're by default open. Right. And we need to make sure we're being good stewards of the public dollar and as a result our procurements are often public. So we'll sit, you know, we'll put out an RFP will courts will get responses back and then they'll publish who got the award. Right. What better way to tell people what content management system used for your website than than to post it publicly. Right. And all it takes is someone who's maybe has a disagreement with with the court or entity and they find out what CMS you have. They figure out what vulnerabilities maybe aren't patched and they exploit them. So putting in controls to make sure that you have policies that if it's related to cybersecurity and can maybe share what your posture, what systems you use make make that confidential or make it a little bit more difficult as part of an open records request and in the end you're only protecting the citizens and your organization a little bit better.

20
00:20:48.000 --> 00:21:49.000
<v Speaker B>Yeah. And I think that's a, I think we're seeing that increase as a common theme not just among cybersecurity, but court security in general. When you're hearing about people trying to scrape public records of personal information or things like that from court records about court judiciary staff. And so I think that's a big, that's a big issue that you have to balance with the, the kind of prerogative to, to make everything open and everything available for the public. So, yeah, just last question. Let's, thanks so much for being here and we've had a wide ranging conversation, so we'll maybe just go to the ideal scenario. What's. If you had your way and were king of the country and had a magic wand and could just do one or multiple things to make, to really increase court cybersecurity, what would that be?

21
00:21:49.000 --> 00:23:37.000
<v Speaker C>The courts have to be open and remain open to ensure public trust and confidence. So it's of course balancing that. But I do think it comes down to funding and making sure that there's funding available to courts, state courts specifically, to be able to, to invest in their cybersecurity programs and also provide education. And there is a, there are federal cybersecurity grants and, but they're typically awarded to state entities. Right? So courts, they may benefit from certain things, their states, their, their states purchase, whether it's DDoS, prevention or some, some appliances and tools like that. If they run in the network. For the most part though, that money does not filter down to those, those state courts or entities because they're a separate branch of government. So I, I think one thing that would help us would be funding specifically targeted at improving state courts. The other thing is too, the courts rely quite a bit on the center for Security and things available from, from CISA because they serve public entities and ensuring that they're funded. And one of the things that the state courts are really trying to adopt right now, and what we're also preaching at the national center is the adoption of the center for Internet Security, critical security controls. And they have three different groups. They have IG1, IG2 and IG3. IG1 is like locking your doors. And that's going to prevent 75% of, help mitigate 75% of attacks that you may have. And they have statistics behind this. IG2 is like locking your doors and having an armed security guard or sorry, I have an alarm system. And some courts do need that, depending on what they do. And then IG3 is having those two things and then a security guard around the perimeter. But even getting courts to ig one or two is, is is great progress and something that we would like to see all courts get to and have the funding to be able to do.

22
00:23:37.000 --> 00:24:25.000
<v Speaker B>Yeah, thank you so much for joining us today. I think I really just learned a ton that that I didn't even even realize was an issue. I think maybe if I were to just sum it up, a lot of what I think access to justice people in the community think about is increasing access to justice. How can we increase access to justice? But we also need to recognize all of the progress, all the access that we've created. We need to maintain and really improving the court and judiciary and criminal justice system cybersecurity posture is about that. It's about maintaining that access that litigants and the public have to our justice system. And thanks again for joining us and everyone have a great day.

23
00:24:25.000 --> 00:24:27.000
<v Speaker C>Thank you very much. Thanks for the opportunity.

24
00:24:27.000 --> 00:24:53.000
<v Speaker A>Proof Over Precedent is a production of the Access to Justice Lab at Harvard Law School. Views expressed in student podcasts are not necessarily those of the ADA J Lab. Thanks for listening. If we piqued your interest, please subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. Even better, leave us a rating or share an episode with a friend or on social media. Here's a sneak preview of what we'll bring you next week.

25
00:24:53.000 --> 00:25:39.000
<v Speaker D>Yeah, so an audit study in our particular instance was to send job applications to real jobs on behalf of fictitious applicants. And what that allowed us to do was randomize some characteristics of the job application, like, say, the name of the applicant, which could in some circumstances indicate something about race or gender. And then you could start to understand how firms are responding to the same type of application with similar characteristics but with different names or other randomized characteristics. In our instance, also potentially with criminal record status, mostly they're done by resumes or job applications. Now, although the original audit studies actually did send kind of pairs of testers to audit rental units or employers

26
00:25:39.000 --> 00:25:40.000
<v Speaker A>or buying cars or

27
00:25:40.000 --> 00:25:45.000
<v Speaker D>buying cars, all kinds of contact.
